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History teaches
us 1: Democritus, Plato, Galileo, Newton, Locke, Descartes, Hume |
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| Democritus |
I wish to demonstrate in a little more
detail the very strange state of affairs already noticed in a famous
fragment of Democritus of Abdera the strange fact that on the one hand
all our knowledge of the world around us, both that gained in everyday
life and that revealed by the most painstaking laboratory experiments,
rests entirely on immediate sense perception, while on the other hand
this knowledge fails to reveal the relations of the sense perceptions
to the outside world, so that in the picture or model that we form of
the outside world, guided by our scientific discoveries, all sensual
qualities are absent.
If you ask a physicist what is his idea of yellow light, he will tell you that it is transversal electromagnetic waves of wavelength in the neighborhood of 590 millimicrons. If you ask him: But where does yellow come in? he will say: In my picture not at all, but these kinds of vibrations, when they hit the retina of a healthy eye, give the person whose eye it is the sensation of yellow.
![]() Plato
Socrates: So
they are, my boy, quite without culture. But others are more clever,
whose secret doctrines I am going to disclose to you. For
them the beginning, upon which all the things we were just now speaking
of depend, is the assumption that everything is real motion and that
there is nothing
besides this, but that there are two kinds of
motion, each infinite in the number of its manifestations, and of these
kinds one has an active, the other a passive force.
From the union and friction of these two are born offspring, infinite in number, but always twins, the object of sense and the sense which is always born and brought forth together with the object of sense. Now we give the senses names like these: sight and hearing and smell, and the sense of cold and of heat, and pleasures and pains and desires and fears and so forth. Those that have names are very numerous, and those that are unnamed are innumerable. Now the class of objects of sense is akin to each of these; all sorts of colors are akin to all sorts of acts of vision, and in the same way sounds to acts of hearing, and the other objects of sense spring forth akin to the other senses. What does this tale mean for us, Theaetetus, with reference to what was said before? Do you see?
Plato |
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![]() Democritus I would rather discover a single causal connection than win the throne of Persia. By convention there
is color,
By convention sweetness, By convention bitterness, But in reality there are atoms and space. ![]() Where does the yellow come in? |
color atoms |
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| Plato | ![]() |
Science is nothing but perception.Wonder [said Socrates] is very much the affection of a philosopher; for there is no other beginning of philosophy than this.
Better a little which is well done, than a great deal imperfectly. Wise people talk because they have something to say; fools, because they have to say something. And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul? Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul. Beauty of style and harmony and grace and good rhythm depend on simplicity. Knowledge is true opinion. The punishment which the wise suffer, who refuse to take part in government, is to live under the government of worse men.
It is a common saying, and in everybody's mouth, that life is but a sojourn. The learning and knowledge that we have, is, at the most, but little compared with that of which we are ignorant. Knowledge which is acquired under compulsion has no hold on the mind. Therefore do not use compulsion, but let early education be rather a sort of amusement; this will better enable you to find out the natural bent of the child. There are three classes of men; lovers of wisdom, lovers of honor, and lovers of gain. The spiritual eyesight improves as the physical eyesight declines. |
vision | |||
| Galileo |
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Swept
on by the inherent necessities of this mathematical metaphysic,
Galileo, like Kepler, was inevitably led to the doctrine of primary and
secondary qualities, only with the Italian genius the doctrine appears
in a much more pronounced and developed form. Galileo makes the clear
distinction between that in the world which is absolute, objective,
immutable, and mathematical; and that which is relative, subjective,
fluctuating, and sensible. [...] The Copernican astronomy and the
achievements of the two new sciences must break us of the natural
assumption that sensed objects are the real or mathematical objects.
They betray certain qualities, which, handled by mathematical rules,
lead us to a knowledge of the true object, and these are the real or
primary qualities, such as number, figure, magnitude, position and
motion [...] qualities
which also can be wholly expressed mathematically. The reality of the
universe is geometrical; the only ultimate characteristics of nature
are those in terms of which certain mathematical knowledge becomes
possible. All other qualities, and these are often far more prominent
to the senses, are secondary, subordinate effects of the primary.
Of the utmost moment was Galileo's further assertion that these secondary qualities are subjective. In Kepler there had been no clear statement of this position; apparently for him the secondary qualities were out there in the astronomical world, like the primary, only they were not so real or fundamental. Burtt
![]() Then, as regards body in particular, we
have only the notion of extension, which entails the notions of shape
and motion; and as regards the soul on its own, we have only the notion
of thought, which includes the perceptions of the intellect and the
inclinations of the will ...
These long chains of perfectly
simple and easy reasoning by means of which geometers are accustomed to
carry out their most difficult demonstrations had led me to fancy that
everything that can fall under human knowledge forms a similar
sequence; and that so long as we avoid accepting as true what is not
so, and always preserve the right order of deduction of one thing from
another, there can be nothing too remote to be reached in the end, or
too well hidden to be discovered.![]() Descartes
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![]() Galileo But it does move. Hence I think that these tastes, odors, colors, etc., on the side of the object in which they seem to exist, are nothing else than mere names, but hold their residence solely in the sensitive body [...] In questions of science the authority of a thousandis not worth the humble reasoning of a single individual. But where the senses fail us, reason must step in. All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered; the point is to discover them. Philosophy
is written in that great book which ever lies before our eyes — I mean
the universe — but we cannot understand it if we do not first learn the
language and grasp the symbols, in which it is written.
This book is written in the mathematical language, and the symbols are
triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, without whose help it
is impossible to comprehend a single word of it; without which one
wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth.
My
dear Kepler, what would you say of the learned here, who, replete with
the pertinacity of the asp, have steadfastly refused to cast a glance
through the telescope? What shall we make of this? Shall we laugh, or
shall we cry?
I do not feel obliged to believe that the same God who has endowed us
with sense, reason, and intellect has intended us to forgo their use.
The
reading of all good books is like a conversation with the finest minds
of past centuries.
With me everything turns into mathematics.
In order to improve the mind, we ought less to learn, than to
contemplate. When writing about transcendental issues, be transcendentally clear Thus what I thought I had seen with my eyes, I actually grasped solely with the faculty of judgment, which is in my mind. |
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| Descartes | ![]() |
mind matter dualism |
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| Newton | ![]() Newton
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For the Rays (of light) to speak properly are not
colored. In them there is nothing else than a certain Power and
Disposition to stir up a Sensation of this or that Color. [...] in the
Rays they are nothing but their Dispositions
to propagate this or that Motion into the Sensorium, and in the Sensorium they are
Sensations of those Motions under the form of Colors.
Newton
![]() It became Him who created it to set it in
order; and if he did so, it is unphilosophical to seek for any other
origin of the world, or to pretend that it might arise out of a chaos
by the mere laws of Nature.
What I have done is due to patient thought. Zeal without knowledge is like expedition to a man in the dark. It is the glory of geometry that from so few principles, fetched from without, it is able to accomplish so much. |
light color optics |
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| Locke |
![]() These I call original or
primary qualities of the body, which I think we may observe to produce
simple ideas in us, viz., solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest,
and number.
Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colour, sounds, tastes, etc., these I call secondary qualities. The ideas [perceptions] of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, [i.e., of qualities of matter] and their patters do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. [...] What is sweet, blue or warm in idea, is but bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves, which we call so ... A piece of manna of a sensible bulk, is able to produce in us the idea of a round or square figure; and by being removed from one place to another, the idea of motion. This idea of motion represents it, as it really is in the manna moving; a circle or square are the same, whether in idea or existence; in the mind or in the manna. And this, both motion and figure are really in the manna, whether we take notice of them or not. This everybody agrees to. Besides, manna by the bulk, figure, texture and motion of its parts has a power to produce the sensation of sickness, or sometimes of acute pains or gripings in us. That these ideas of sickness and pain are not in the manna, but effects of its operations on us, and are nowhere when we feel them not: this also everyone readily agrees to. And yet men are hardly to be brought to think, that sweetness and whiteness are not really in manna ... Locke ![]() [All] chemical binding is electromagnetic
in origin, and so are all phenomena of nerve impulses.
Salam
[...]
the whole spatial world becomes a vast machine, including even the
movements of animal bodies and those processes in human physiology
which are independent of conscious attention. This world has no
dependence on thought whatever, its whole machinery would continue to
exist and operate if there were no human beings in existence at all. On
the other hand, there is the inner realm whose essence is thinking,
whose modes are such subsidiary processes as perception, willing,
feeling, imagining, etc.,
In which realm, then, shall we place the secondary qualities? The answer given is inevitable. We can conceive the primary qualities to exist in bodies as they really are; not so the secondary. "In truth they can be representative of
nothing that exists out of the mind." They are, to be sure, caused by
the various effects on our organs of the motions of the small
insensible parts of the bodies. Burtt
![]() Hume
A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence. Be a philosopher; but amidst
all your philosophy, be still a man.
If we imagine a machine so constructed as to produce thought, sensation, perception, we may conceive it magnified to such an extent that one might enter it like a mill. This being supposed, we should find in it on inspection only pieces which impel each other, but nothing which can explain a perception. It is in the simple substance, therefore, not in the compound, or in the machinery, that we must look for that phenomenon [...] §
Although the whole of this life were said to be nothing but a dream and the physical world nothing but a phantasm, I should call this dream or phantasm real enough, if, using reason well, we were never deceived by it. § Since this is the best (or worst) of all possible worlds, the laws of physics can best be described by variational principles. Leibniz
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![]() Locke Education begins the gentleman, but reading, good company and reflection must finish him. No man's knowledge
here can go beyond
his experience. Logic is the anatomy of thought. The great art to learn much is to undertake a little at a time. The power of perception is that which we call the understanding. Whatsoever
the mind perceives of itself, or is the immediate object of perception,
thought, or understanding, that I call an idea. We are
taught to clothe our minds, as we do our bodies, after the fashion in
vogue; and it is accounted fantastical or something worse, not to do so. All men
are liable to error; and most men are, in many points, by passion or
interest, under temptation to it. Experience:
in that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately
derives itself. Our observation employed either about external or
sensible objects or about the internal operations of our minds,
perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our
understandings with all the materials of thinking.
Firmness or stiffness of the mind is not from adherence to truth, but submission to prejudice. General observations drawn from particulars are the jewels of knowledge, comprehending great store in a little room. Habits wear more constantly and with greatest force than reason, which, when we have most need of it, is seldom fairly consulted, and more rarely obeyed. Reading furnishes the mind only with materials of knowledge; it is thinking that makes what we read ours. |
primary secondary |
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| Burtt |
The world as described by natural science has no obvious place for
colors, tastes, or smells. Problems with sensory qualities have been
philosophically and scientifically troublesome since ancient times, and
in modern form at least since Galileo in 1623 identified some sensory
qualities as characterizing nothing real in the objects themselves [...]
The qualities of size, figure (or shape), number, and motion are for Galileo the only real properties of objects. All other qualities revealed in sense perception--colors, tastes, odors, sounds, and so on--exist only in the sensitive body, and do not qualify anything in the objects themselves. They are the effects of the primary qualities of things on the senses. Without the living animal sensing such things, these 'secondary' qualities (to use the term introduced by Locke) would not exist. Much of modern philosophy has devolved from this fateful distinction. While it was undoubtedly helpful to the physical sciences to make the mind into a sort of dustbin into which one could sweep the troublesome sensory qualities, this stratagem created difficulties for later attempt to arrive at some scientific understanding of the mind. In particular, the strategy cannot be reapplied when one goes on to explain sensation and perception. If physics cannot explain secondary qualities, then it seems that any science that can explain secondary qualities must appeal to explanatory principles distinct from those of physics. Thus are born various dualisms. Clark |
mechanism |
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| Hume | ![]() ![]() |
The fundamental principle of that philosophy is the opinion concerning colors, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold; which it asserts to be nothing but impressions in the mind, deriv'd from the operation of external objects, and without any resemblance to the qualities of the objects. §
This principle being once admitted, all other doctrines of that
philosophy seem to follow by an easy consequence. For upon the removal
of sounds, colors, heat, cold, and other sensible qualities, from the
rank of continu'd independent existences, we are reduced merely to what
are called primary qualities,as the only real ones, of which we have any adequate notion. These
primary qualities are extension and solidity, with their different
mixtures and modifications; figure, motion, gravity and cohesion. The
genera- tion, encrease,
decay and corruption of animals and vegetables, are nothing but changes
of figure and motion; as also the operations of all bodies on each
other; of fire, of light, water, air, earth, and of all the elements
and powers of nature [...]
Thus there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and senses [...] When we reason from cause and effect, we conclude, that neither color, sound, taste, nor smell have a continued and independent existence. When we exclude these sensible qualities there remains nothing in the universe, which has such an existence.
![]() Leibniz
There is nothing besides perceptions and their changes to be found in the simple substance. There are two kinds of truths: those of reasoning and those of facts. The truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible; the truths of fact are contingent and their opposites are possible. Even in the games of children there are things to interest the greatest mathematician. I have said more than once, that I hold space to be something purely relative, as time; an order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions. We must, in addition to purely
mathematical principles, recognize metaphysical ones [in physics].
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materialism |
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| Leibniz | monads | |||||
| Berkeley | ![]() ![]() Berkeley All the choir of
heaven and furniture of earth -- in a word, all those
bodies which compose the frame of the world -- have not any
subsistence without a mind.
The eye by long use comes to see even in the darkest cavern: and there is no subject so obscure but we may discern some glimpse of truth by long poring on it. Truth is the cry of all, but the game of few. Others indeed may talk, and write, and fight about liberty, and make an outward pretence to it; but the free-thinker alone is truly free. |
The
trivial proposition which I propose to dispute is this: esse
is percipi. This is a very ambiguous proposition, but, in
some sense or other, it has been very widely held. That it is, in some
sense, essential to Idealism, I must for the present merely assume.
What I propose to show is that, in all the senses ever given to it, it
is false.
Moore What I
dislike in this kind of argumentation is the basic positivistic
attitude, which from my view is untenable, and which seems to me to
come to the same thing as Berkeley's principle, esse est percipi.
Einstein The
method of Fluxions is the general key by help whereof the modern
mathematicians unlock the secrets of Geometry, and consequently of
Nature. Berkeley |
idealism | |||